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Abstract 
Neuroscientific research increasingly sparks the imaginations and hopes of policymakers. 
Whilst the diversity of assertive statements being made on the basis of neuroscience has been 
well documented, less frequently explored are more contingent discourses regarding studies 
of the brain. In this paper, we analyze how social policy and service actors discuss their 
engagements with neuroscientific terms, concepts and findings. These are mobilized, for one, 
to substantiate and enlarge the focus of existing policy—for example to attract funding for 
different target groups (such as babies, people who just retired, etc.)—as well as to help 
develop (new) policies and services. We show how, in so doing, invocation of the 
neurosciences can act to align “mutual imagined understandings” among policy actors, 
practitioners and parents. Tentativeness and ambivalence also figured within our 
respondents’ accounts of the use of the neurosciences. They argued that research had to be 
simplified in order to make it relevant for wider stakeholders (including politicians), whilst 
simultaneously considering simplification problematic in some cases. Our analysis 
foregrounds the different complexities, ambivalences, reductions and instrumentalizations 
involved in policy and service engagements with the neurosciences, rendering challengeable 
any notion that (ideas about) neuroscientific research “determines” policy in a linear sense.  
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Introduction 
Neuroscience has fired the imaginations and expectations of policy actors internationally. 
Beyond the sphere of mental health, policy engagement with the brain has perhaps been most 
prevalent in initiatives around the first three years of life (often termed, “the early years”). In 
the UK, for example, findings and concepts from the neurosciences have been imported into 
policy debates and practice developments in order to emphasize the importance of the first 
three years of children’s lives (a period where their brains are said to grow rapidly) (Broer 
and Pickersgill 2015; Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2014; O'Connor and Joffe 2013). These “early 
years” are framed as a “window of opportunity” in which interventions with and for parents 
and children can make a real difference to new lives, and there has been a rise in training 
courses for parents to capitalize on this.  
The visibility of the neurosciences within UK policy has been documented 
extensively in recent years (Broer and Pickersgill 2015; Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2014; 
Wastell and White 2012; Edwards, Gillies, and Horsley 2015). A feature of much of this 
literature is a critique of policymakers, who are often regarded as misusing the neurosciences 
(Wastell and White 2012, 402; Edwards, Gillies, and Horsley 2015; Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish 
2015a; Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish 2015b.) Rosalind Edwards and colleagues, for example, 
argue that “pseudo-scientific ‘brain science’ discourse is co-opted to bolster policy claims 
about optimal childrearing” (Edwards, Gillies, and Horsley 2015, 2). Scholars have also 
shown how a neurobiological idiom in parenting discourses can help to constitute a focus on 
individual parents rather than on the social and economic circumstances in which they find 
themselves. The result is that parents (especially mothers) come to be more anxious about 
raising their children (Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2015; Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2014; Wall 
2004; Wall 2010).  
In this paper, we develop work on the figuration of the neurosciences within policy, 
analyzing how actors involved in social policy and service communities in Scotland account 
for their (non-)use of neuroscientific notions and findings. Specifically, our analysis addresses 
two main questions. First, how do different actors account for the mobilization of 
neuroscience for policy and services? Second, what role do expectations, contingencies and 
legitimations play in these accounts? 
 
 
Conceptual Background 
In order to respond to the questions above, we take analytic cues from three key literatures: 
(1) on (low) expectations, (2) on discourses of contingency and hope in scientific talk and talk 
about science, and (3) on the political use of expert knowledge. With regard to the first, 
sociologists of expectations argue that “analyzing the dynamics of expectations is a key 
element in understanding scientific and technological change” (Borup et al. 2006, 286). 
Technoscientific expectations are a way of attracting and synthesizing different kinds of 
capital in a world that increasingly wants to know upfront what the societal impact of 
research will be. Such expectations help enroll different actors, including universities and 
patient organizations, in the quest for innovation, but they also pave the way for strong 
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disappointment later on (Brown 2003). Expectations are performative, i.e., they co-produce 
the future they deal with by enabling “some technoscientific worlds, and disabl[ing] others” 
(Brown and Michael 2003, 14).  
Aside from the highly promissory discourses that initially secured the attention of 
STS scholars (Brown 2003; Martin, Brown, and Kraft 2008; Martin, Brown, and Turner 2008; 
Brown 2005), low expectations have also been the subject of scholarly examination. While they 
do not use the term “sociology of expectations” per se, Moreira and Palladino (2005) can be 
considered to have provided an analytic platform for studying low expectations. They regard 
biomedicine as encapsulating both a “regime of hope” that is “characterized by the view that 
new and better treatments are always about to come” (p. 67) and “a regime of truth” that is 
situated in what is positively known, including how hopes can lead to disappointment and 
failure. Low expectations, then, are generally situated in a regime of truth (Gardner, Samuel, 
and Williams 2015) and they have been analyzed in different forms; for example, the 
pessimistic and cautionary claims made by industry actors (Tutton 2011), the modification of 
patient expectations (Gardner, Samuel, and Williams 2015), and the dialectic between hope 
and skepticism about the translation of neuroscience into clinical practice (Fitzgerald 2014; 
Pickersgill 2011). With regard to the latter, Fitzgerald attributes the low expectations evident 
within his data in part to the “private, reflective and conversational mode of sociological 
intervention,” i.e., interviews with researchers wherein they felt able to reflect carefully and 
candidly on the possibilities and problems of (translational) research (Fitzgerald 2014, 258).  
Earlier scholarship, which in some senses anticipated the work of both Fitzgerald and 
Moreira and Palladino, has likewise shown how scientists draw on different, seemingly 
contradictory, repertoires. In particular, the path-breaking work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1982) 
explores scientists’ use of both “empiricist” and “contingent” repertoires in accounting for 
their beliefs. The former repertoire is one in which data is presented as determining truth; the 
latter, on the other hand, “depict[s] the relationship between fact and theory in a much more 
contingent matter” (p. 400). In contingent repertoires, facts depend on interpretation. 
Scientists draw flexibly upon these two repertoires at different moments and in varying 
contexts. In later work, Mulkay analyzed how scientific research is employed within political 
debates, showing that hope and fear were rhetorical devices adopted in UK parliamentary 
debates on the control of conduct in research on human embryos (Mulkay 1993). Both of these 
studies are helpful as a framework for understanding contingencies and ambivalences 
regarding the normative and intrinsic significance of (biomedical) research (see also Kerr and 
Cunningham-Burley 2000; Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Tutton 2007), as well as the 
relationship between science, policy and society. Specifically, Gilbert’s and Mulkay’s work 
indicates how tentativeness and certitude, hopes and fears, can co-exist and be employed to 
strategic ends.  
This point also connects to the last key strand of literature we draw upon, which 
more directly investigates the political use of expert knowledge. Boswell (2008), for example, 
argues how knowledge utilization in politics can have an overtly instrumental function to 
adjust policies, as well as serving a symbolic function. This latter role includes the 
substantiation of policy preferences, and the legitimization of (the work of) organizations by 
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“endow[ing] [them] with ‘epistemic authority’” (p. 472). Where Boswell has investigated the 
way policy actors use knowledge, other scholars have looked at how scientific advice gets 
constructed (by scientists) in such a fashion as to assist in decision making in contested 
political issues. Such scholars have argued, for instance, that the means through which 
scientific research comes to be collected and negotiated is a “backstage” process that can 
differ extensively from the “frontstage” process of presenting and using the science for and in 
policy (Bijker, Bal, and Hendriks 2009; Hilgartner 2012; Hilgartner 2000). 
Accordingly, it seems that contingencies and different repertoires (or “frontstage” 
and “backstage” processes) are constitutive of the relations between policy and research, and 
scientists especially have been shown to articulate divergent discourses when talking about 
their work and beliefs. With regard to how neuroscience has been used in policies and 
services, focus has predominantly rested on the visibility of brain research (and the facticity 
with which it is imbued). This might, in part, result from a methodological emphasis on 
documents. Where studies have been concerned with the “frontstage” of policy, this is, of 
course, entirely appropriate. Yet, in attending explicitly to public-facing documents in 
analyses of neuroscience, policy and society, social scientists (including ourselves, see Broer 
and Pickersgill 2015) may implicitly be constructing an understanding of policy and service 
communities that renders the individuals that comprise them as being more 
epistemologically and normatively certain than in fact they are. Exploring policy actors’ 
reflections in interviews regarding their own and others’ engagements with the neurosciences 
can, we believe, cast a bright light on how contingencies and uncertainties operate within the 
discursive worlds of policy and service design and delivery.  
 
 
Neuroscience in Policy and Practice 
We draw on insights from the literatures discussed above in order to analyze how a range of 
actors account for the use of neuroscience in policies and services. Our data (discussed more 
fully below) comes from 11 interviews conducted in Scotland in 2014. By examining our 
respondents’ discussions of “scientific research” (which we understand here both as actual 
specific scientific articles and findings, and an imagined and assumed neurobiological 
“canon”), we adopt a “symmetrical” position common in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK) (Bloor 1991) and other traditions within STS. Accordingly, we diverge from 
the interests of some other authors concerned with neuroscience and policy (for example, 
Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2014; Wastell and White 2012; Edwards, Gillies, and Horsley 2015). 
Our principal concerns lie neither with the accuracy of our respondents’ understandings of 
neuroscience, nor the appropriateness of the uses to which it is put.  Rather, we are interested 
in the question of whether neuroscientific research is salient to our respondents, and, if so, 
how. 
Our contribution to the STS literature through this paper will be threefold. First, we 
will contribute to discussions around (low) expectations by considering them within policy 
discourse (rather than within narratives emerging from healthcare settings, scientific 
institutions, or industry (Gardner, Samuel, and Williams 2015; Tutton 2011; Fitzgerald 2014; 
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51 
Pickersgill 2011)).  Second, our analysis will augment literatures concerned with the ways in 
which different actors draw on (neuro)science for policy and service design and delivery 
(Broer and Pickersgill 2015; Edwards, Gillies, and Horsley 2015; Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish 
2015a; Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish 2015b) especially through underscoring the ambiguities and 
uncertainties present in their accounts. Third, this paper enhances empirical specificity 
concerning the impacts and translation of neuroscientific knowledge in contemporary society 
(Bröer and Heerings 2013; Buchman et al. 2013; Pickersgill 2013; Pickersgill et al. 2015; Rose 
2007; Rose and Abi-Rached 2013; Singh 2013; Vidal 2009; Vrecko 2010).  
 
 
Methods 
This research forms part of a larger Leverhulme Trust-funded project (“Neuroscience and 
Family Life: The Brain in Policy and Everyday Practice”), which investigates how the 
neurosciences are (not) engaged with in different contexts, including in policy, the media, and 
domestic spheres. The strand of the study presented here analyzed engagements with brain 
research by actors involved in policy-making communities. We conducted 11 semi-structured 
interviews with Scottish policy and practice actors working in three key areas: the early years, 
adolescence, and older adulthood. Each are life stages for which their associated biological 
and cultural markers have been discussed in terms of (changes in) the brain (Broer and 
Pickersgill 2015; Choudhury, McKinney, and Merten 2012; Pickersgill 2014; Williams, Higgs, 
and Katz 2012). 
We deliberately aimed for a diverse sample, to try and capture wide-ranging 
experiences with how concepts and findings from the neurosciences (might) impact and 
shape social policy and services. We began by speaking informally with people who have 
contacts in the Scottish and local government and social services, which resulted in a “long-
list” of about 50 people. We then selected a “short-list” of key individuals in various policy 
domains and “levels” (e.g. local versus national), including people involved in influencing 
policy, formulating policy, and translating policy to social services. Our final respondent list 
included people working in different sectors (i.e., statutory and voluntary), reflecting our 
understanding of policymaking communities as not solely restricted to politicians and civil 
servants (Smith and Katikireddi 2013). Our respondents were, for instance, directors of 
charity organizations or heads of local authority or national departments (i.e., local 
government worker, national government worker), as we expected such individuals to have 
an overarching perspective on the dynamic relationships between research, policy and 
practice. Their roles were likewise wide-ranging.3  
Whereas most of the work in the UK on the impact of the neurosciences on policy has 
been concerned with England, Scotland is also important to consider. In Scotland, policies 
and practices from England impact and shape agendas and innovations—at the same time, 
Scottish developments can and do contour those in England. While Scottish policy is arguably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Table 1 provides more information on our respondents, although in order to protect their anonymity we cannot be 
very specific.	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52 
developing its own “style,” we suggest that our key findings can nevertheless be 
generalizable given the broad similarities between processes of policymaking and 
implementation across the UK (Cairney 2008; Cairney 2011). As our interviews took place 
right before and after the referendum concerning whether Scotland should become formally 
independent from the rest of the UK (held on September 18, 2014), this context will certainly 
 
 Role: Life stage focus: 
1 Principal Officer, Scottish Local Authority Early years/adolescence 
2 Senior Officer, Scottish Local Authority Older adulthood 
3 Director, Scottish Charity Early years 
4 Member, Voluntary Parent Organization Primarily adolescence  
5 Project Manager, Scottish Voluntary Organisation Early years and adolescence 
6 Head of Research, International Charity Older adulthood 
7 Representative, Scottish Charity Older adulthood 
8 Policymaker Early years 
9 Former Senior Civil Servant, Scottish Government/Officer, 
Scottish Charity 
Primarily early years  
10 Policy Advisor Primarily early years  
11 Scottish Director, UK Children’s Charity Primarily early years  
Table 1: Interview respondents 
 
have contoured the tone and content of the interviews. However, we do not want to overplay 
the impact of the referendum on our participants’ talk (and the practices and processes 
communicated therein). In particular, only two respondents explicitly mentioned it. We 
suggest that the referendum shaped our interviews through the impacts of its associated 
campaigns on the discursive space within which ideas about “the good society” could be 
considered and rehearsed. Hence, our respondents may have been more willing (and able) to 
articulate their concerns and hopes for the future than they would otherwise have been.  
The interviews were conducted by Broer between July and November 2014. With 
appropriate consent, all were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis.4 We had expected 
each interview encounter to last less than an hour, since we did not anticipate that our busy 
respondents would be able to grant us a larger diary slot than this. Yet, most spoke much 
longer than an hour. This, we suggest, reflects the salience of the topics under discussion for 
our interviewees, as well as their appreciation of the opportunity to reflect on these issues. An 
interview guide was employed, which was designed to prompt participant talk around their 
role in social policy and/or services, the relevance of the neurosciences for their policy 
area(s), and the possible benefits and risks associated with using neuroscientific knowledge 
for policy and services. Following the production of a draft of this article, we sent the quotes 
that we wanted to use to the respondents for their approval. Two of the seven respondents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The recorder failed halfway through interview 5. Immediately after the interview, Broer wrote up notes 
from the interview mostly based on memory. 
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53 
(Respondents 1 and 8) whose interview data we quoted suggested small changes to enhance 
legibility and coherence. 
The completed interviews were rather varied in terms of tone and content. Following 
initial interrogation and discussion of the data separately and together, we pursued our 
analysis by writing narrative summaries of the interviews, in order to elucidate the themes 
that felt most resonant across the transcripts (Ross, in press). Four themes best captured the 
engagements with the neurosciences that were the stimulus for the interviews, and the 
ostensive focus of the discussions. These were: (1) hope and the hope to change; (2) 
tentativeness and awareness of simplification; (3) the capacity of the neurosciences to 
substantiate existing policies and ideas and to help develop policies; and (4) the necessity and 
the right of the state to intervene in the lives of its citizens. The fourth theme we saw as 
generally overarching in nature, encompassing most of the other three themes. The 
transcripts were then coded with NVivo software, using the four themes as codes, with 
additional codes created to incorporate other relevant content. We do not explicitly structure 
our paper as an exegesis of these group codes; rather, we use them (and especially our initial 
key themes) as a guide for the ensuing narrative, which seeks to make a conceptual and 
empirical contribution to understanding the use of (neuro)science in policy and services.  
In what follows, we first show how neuroscientific knowledge is employed to imbue 
policies and practices with epistemic authority; we then proceed to describe more fully the 
often instrumental, commonly reflexive and sometimes cautious engagements of our 
respondents with neuroscience for policy and service design and delivery. Though 
appropriate to our study questions and context, our representational interview strategy, 
based on policy design and implementation in a small country, means that we conclude on a 
somewhat contingent note of our own: we are a little reluctant to make bold, universalizing 
claims about the nature of science and policy. Nevertheless, we feel that our central 
arguments—around the different complexities, expectations, ambivalences, and 
instrumentalities inherent to the use of (neuro)science in social policies and services, and 
hence the difficulties of ascertaining clear determinacies—are likely to find their equivalents 
in other contexts and nations.  
 
 
Epistemic Authority 
In this first section, we show how the neurosciences were seen to be used as a means to 
substantiate policies, especially in terms of granting these “epistemic authority” (Boswell 
2008) and, hence, for securing funding for (proposed) services. In particular, our interviewees 
considered that neuroscientific concepts and findings could provide further (and compelling) 
justification for changes that they felt ought to be made anyway—policy changes aimed at 
impacting, for example, inequalities, parenting styles, and (un)healthy lifestyles.  
Narratives of hope (particularly hope for societal change, a major theme within civil 
society discourse at the time of the interviews), and also of its absence, were prominent in our 
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interviewees’ talk.5 Such narratives related to stories of dissatisfaction: respondents were 
concerned about budget cuts, inequalities, children being fed unhealthy food, older people 
being discriminated against, and about people feeling overly guilty regarding their parenting 
practices. Respondent 10, for example, described society as a “disgrace,” with widening 
inequalities and “people who can't afford to eat for three or four days a week.” Respondent 9 
also expressed his worries about society, for instance by speaking of his concern for service-
users’ “level of ignorance” regarding the raising of their children, and which somehow 
“we’ve got to try and turn around.” He, as well as other respondents, saw the neurosciences 
as a way of understanding a world that concerned him, helping to enjoin action: 
 
I mean, I suppose from the early years’ perspective one of the strongest drivers for 
promoting early years and getting politicians of all parties on side was the evidence 
about the development of the child’s brain from conception through the womb to 
birth […] The impact of stress related hormones and chemicals on the child’s 
development. The impact of neglect, abuse on a child’s brain development. 
  
Respondent 3, who occupied a senior role in a Scottish charity, described how in policies 
relating to young children, neuroscientific research “keeps us a bit more on track in terms of 
what is it that we’re trying to do.” All respondents working in the early years agreed that 
neuroscientific findings had helped to increase funding for services in this area, in part by 
confirming findings of other disciplines such as the social sciences—or, indeed, by providing 
a firmer epistemological footing for “common-sense” ideas about care and love. Respondent 
1, working for local government and involved in pulling together and writing courses for 
parents, discussed this: 
I think that actually changed, that it wasn't just that it was nice to be loving and kind 
and supportive and talk to children and interact with them. It was nice, but actually 
what the researchers were saying, what they put to the debate is that, it's essential for 
development. It’s essential for physical and physiological and neuronal development. 
I think it was the kind of, well you can’t squeeze out of that, if everybody is saying 
the same thing, including the scientists, the neuroscientists, then I think it that's why 
it's become part of policy now. That's why there’s getting it right for every child, 
that's why there’s Curriculum for Excellence [a program in Scottish educational 
policy], looking at social and emotional wellbeing, that's probably why we have been 
funded, do you know what I mean?  
Respondent 7, who occupied a senior role in a charity concerned with older adulthood and 
whose function in part is to influence policy and translate policy into services, argued that 
any charitable venture associated with children or cancer would be more likely to obtain 
funding since “it tugs the heart strings more.” Yet, neuroscientific findings on how to prevent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Most of the respondents were, to different degrees, directly involved in using the neurosciences for 
their policies and/or services (such as by reading studies, selecting the research, and helping to 
determine the possible consequences and practical implications for policy), though generally they talked 
from a more collective, organisational perspective, often by using the word ‘we’. 
	  
Tineke Broer and Martyn Pickersgill                                                    Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 1 (2015) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
55 
cognitive decline and improve healthy ageing helped his organization to successfully plead 
for funding too. In his words, “the research helps us because that helps support the reasoning 
and potential for change.”6  
Respondent 10 explicitly and strategically invoked neuroscientific findings within 
policy discussions to plea for substantive changes to governance in order to address what he 
regarded as inadequate policy responses to inequalities: 
 
[I]n trying to bring some science to this, I'm trying to move the argument...it's all very 
well for me saying, “it's disgraceful,” there's hundreds of other people out there who 
are saying “it's disgraceful.” But I'm saying, “actually, the disgraceful way you treat 
the poor people means their families are fractured, and it means generation after 
generation is growing up to have problems [due to the reproduction of 
neurobiological impairment]. So stop it!” 
 
Respondent 10 further maintained that “the harder the science the better” in order to 
convince politicians and society in general. Echoing social scientific reflections that have 
underscored the potency of neuro-images (Dumit 2004; Joyce 2005; Cohn 2004), he reflected: 
 
Well you know, if you tell a society that the way in which they nurture children 
changes the way their brains develop, and you show them pictures that corroborate 
that, it's pretty compelling. No one wants to damage a child's brain, or to deny a child 
the opportunity to develop their brain properly. It's emotive, and it's powerful. 
   
According to Respondent 10, the “hard” neurosciences have greater political traction than 
“soft” psychological research (for example), which is “always a bit hypothetical.” To this end, 
he used brain research in presentations for a range of actors including policymakers. 
Respondent 9, who had attended some of these talks and was a civil servant at that time, 
argued that the research addressed in Respondent 10’s presentations was “a great unifier.” 
Later on in the interview he explained: 
 
I like evidence-based policies and I like being able to explain and defend things on 
the basis of: here’s the child’s brain size at x months in a nurtured loving household. 
Here’s a child’s brain at the same age in a neglected household and it’s half the size. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In general, the use of the neurosciences in policies on older adulthood seemed to be looked at in an 
unequivocally positive way in contrast to those on early years. The three people we interviewed who 
were involved in shaping policy for older adults all had existing relationships with one of our study co-
investigators, who is involved in neuroscientific research. Positive aspects of the neurosciences and the 
influence of brain research on policy may thus have been especially emphasised in these interviews. On 
the other hand, journalistic and social scientific critiques of the ‘misuse’ of the neurosciences have been 
mostly targeted towards early years policy, so criticism would perhaps have been less likely to come up 
in the interviews around older adulthood since a visible critical discourse was not easily available for 
deployment within the interview talk. Further, the neurological challenges of ageing have emerged as a 
key social problem in the UK, and so the aligning of issues faced by older adults with changes in the 
brain is a relatively unproblematic stance for our interviewees to assume. 
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Our interviews with Respondents 9 and 10, then, highlight not just the currency of scientific 
research within policy, but also the diverse values different epistemologies have within policy 
contexts (with the neurosciences coming to occupy a place of enhanced objectivity relative to 
more established modes of study). The interviews also show how mobilizing the 
neurosciences can be implicitly aimed to connect policy actors and align them around 
particular goals based on “mutual imagined understandings” (Martin, Brown, and Kraft 
2008, 38).  
The way the neurosciences at once substantiate and change policy was also discussed 
in the interview with Respondent 8. He was involved in reshaping the Scottish policy 
architecture for looked-after young people (i.e., children in care, such as foster homes), and 
argued that the neurosciences give policymakers an understanding of when, why and how to 
intervene, for example with respect to adoptions: 
 
We would talk about the language of aspiration. So we would say that brain science 
would tell us that, for an adoption to be successful, the child should be as young as 
possible. The reason for that is that they have the best chance of re-attaching to a new 
parent, with the least amount of, sort of, well I suppose the least amount of effort, if 
you like, on the part of the adopter […] So without the neuroscience, you know, it 
would have been hard for us to make the case for change. It would have been hard 
for us to credibly tell social work: you need to do something different. 
 
The ambiguous nature of the use of science in policy is underscored by Respondent 8’s 
comments: whilst neuroscience “tells” policy actors how services should be organized, it also 
acts to make planned changes “credible.” This then suggests (in Boswell’s idiom) that 
neuroscience can be used both for overtly instrumental reasons and for more symbolic 
purposes (i.e., when it is aimed at legitimizing or substantiating policies) (Boswell 2008). One 
corollary of this, we suggest, is a need to be cautious in any claims-making around the extent 
to and manner with which neuroscience “determines” policy.  
To summarize, in this section we have shown how some respondents saw the use of 
the neurosciences for a substantiation of policy as what we might call an “obligatory 
rhetorical passage point” (cf. Callon 1986) in order to secure different kinds of capital to 
support new or existing policy initiatives, nationally or locally, that might improve society. 
The future, as imagined in terms of risks to, for example, brain development, is “mobilized in 
the present” (Brown 2003, 5). Because of “mutual imagined understandings” (Martin, Brown, 
and Kraft 2008, 38) of the import of neurobiological health and impairment, early 
interventions or prevention are key terms in policy actors’ accounts. Such ventures (e.g., early 
years intervention) seemed to encapsulate particular imaginaries of a “good society” and a 
certain hope regarding the possibility of effecting societal transformations.  
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Cautious Engagements 
Despite all of the respondents’ sense that the neurosciences were important, their views 
varied with respect to the substantiation of (especially) early years policies through the 
neurosciences. The interviewees discussed in the previous section were generally positive—
or at least fairly neutral—about using the neurosciences in part symbolically for policies. In 
this section, though, we will show how some respondents were more critically or cautiously 
engaged with neuroscientific research.  
One of the main tropes in the interview with Respondent 5, for example, was a slightly 
critical stance towards the use of neuroscience as a “justification” for policy that gradually 
became apparent through the interview:  
 
It’s interesting isn’t it because thinking about it, I think it’s used as a justification. 
How much it actually influences what people do anyway or actually changes practice 
from what people were doing in the first place, I’m not altogether sure. People feel 
more often…I mean, there’s more and more use of parenting programs and a lot of 
them are not, I don’t think they would be primarily based on the neuroscience, but 
they may well use neuroscience as a kind of reason to use their programs more now. 
 
This justification has been the case for the early years, according to Respondent 5, but she saw 
the neurosciences also increasingly being used to back up policies and services around 
teenagers and supporting parents of teenagers. Whereas this interviewee argued that we 
might learn from the neurosciences—like about adjusting school schedules based on recent 
findings concerning circadian rhythms of adolescents that are said to differ from those of 
adults—she thought that they are now often used for “social engineering,” where “middle 
class values” were being “imposed” on “poor parents” (i.e., parents living in poverty). This 
resonates with critiques of “intensive parenting” advanced by some sociologists and social 
policy scholars (Lee 2008; Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish 2015b; Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2014; 
Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2015; Edwards, Gillies, and Horsley 2015; Wall 2004; Wall 2010). 
Respondent 5 furthermore reflected on why the neurosciences are used in policies, instead of 
(or in different ways than) the social sciences: 
 
The problem for me in some ways with social policy is we accept that social sciences 
are inexact sciences, but we…generally a lot of social scientists and people whose 
backgrounds in the arts, accept that science is like the Bible, except the Bible is not 
taken verbatim now. They have a trust in science that they don’t have in social 
science and rather than having the emphasis on, say, relationships or how we behave 
towards each other, there’s a tendency to put the trust in something that’s scientific 
and that we can “prove” that works […] And I think from my understanding of it and 
what I’ve read it is very much an emerging field and we treat it on a really simplistic 
basis. 
  
When asked why this might be the case, she answered: 
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Because I think people don’t understand it and the kind of almost top line, bottom 
line, you know, it’s almost like having that graph or having those few lines is enough. 
What they’re interested in and rightly, is what you can do in the early years and then 
this is just used as a justification […] If you’re not scientific or you haven’t gone down 
that route at school, I think […] it may be difficult to understand and people actually 
don’t want to go into neuroscience and that understanding because their interest is 
somewhere else. Their interest is in early years. 
 
In spite of her complaint that policymakers did not engage sufficiently with scientific 
complexity, as a policy actor herself she nevertheless revealed how at least some who are 
involved in service design and delivery are aware of the difficulties inherent in interpreting 
the import of “an emerging field” of science. This suggests the existence of different, 
seemingly contradictory narratives in discourses surrounding and constituting policymaking 
and service delivery regarding the early years (Gilbert and Mulkay 1982).  
Respondents did not reserve such criticisms for private interviews with us. Some of 
them reported to be actively involved in correcting misunderstandings of the neurosciences 
within policy and services. Respondent 1, who was involved in making courses for parents 
and teachers of children and teenagers, evoked neuroscientific research on plasticity when 
she stated:  
Not only is it really helpful in making you reflect on your parenting or your 
professional practice. It’s very hopeful, the great news about all of these different 
research, I think is that it's really, really, hopeful, because what it's saying is, just 
because a child’s had a difficult start in life doesn’t mean that’s going to be them for 
the rest of their lives. The brain can and does change in response to subsequent 
experiences. It says that even if a child maybe is more sensitive or more, you know, or 
has various different risk factors, relationships can make a difference. Even if you've 
already got good relationships, changing and improving that in your communication 
styles will have better outcomes for the future. 
Respondent 1 also reacted against the idea that the brain stops developing at age 3: 
But, the idea that it's all or nothing by then there is absolutely immense research to 
say that's not the case. Especially given resilience research, and what we now know 
about the adolescent brain and how that goes through its massive period of 
remodeling. So, I think I can understand why some people are very cautious about 
the use of neuroscience being inappropriately used. But I think that fatalistic thing 
isn’t backed up by research, so I think that's what’s exciting, but it is sometimes 
misinformed, and we have sometimes gone to early years establishments, we do 
training in early years establishments and have asked people “who thinks that the 
brain stops developing at three” and people put their hands up, but that is why it is 
important to do this kind of training with them to combat these myths. 
Hence, new neuroscientific research is made use of to correct the “misinformed” views of 
staff who are only familiar with apparently outdated ideas about the brain—notions which 
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have also been critiqued in sociological and social policy literatures (see Lowe, Lee, and 
Macvarish 2015a; Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish 2015b; Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2014; 
Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2015; Wastell and White 2012).7 This keenness to correct suggests 
an on-going engagement by some policy actors with different kinds of research into the brain 
and the psyche that complicates attempts to characterize “the” way that the neurosciences 
influence social policy and service provision. The somewhat more cautious engagements with 
neuroscience characterized above are indicative, we suggest, of a kind of “contingent” 
repertoire (about how the neurosciences are and should be used in policy and services) that 
nevertheless draws on a more “empiricist” register in terms of the facticity of (different) 
scientific studies (cf. Gilbert and Mulkay 1982). 
  
 
Pragmatic Reductionism 
Above we showed how some respondents were aware of a tendency to simplify research 
within policymaking communities (and on occasion were wary of doing so). Other 
interviewees argued that this is almost inherent in and necessary for policymaking (see also 
Shackley and Wynne 1996; Stevens 2011). In this section, we borrow a term from Beck and 
Niewöhner (2006, 223) and analyze this position as a kind of “pragmatic reductionism,” 
which we define here as the translation of complex research findings into a coherent, 
straightforward message designed to enjoin practical action. 
For example, Respondent 3 (a very senior representative of a charity whose function in 
part is to influence policy and translate policy into services) reflected on how neuroscientific 
and other studies have influenced the approaches his organization takes: 
[Organization] is a very practical, predominately service delivery organization and 
the main thing that we were trying to bridge with our Early Years Strategy was to 
take enough of the science to say: yes this seems to have good evidence that this is 
what we should do and turn it into something practical […] And was sufficiently 
linked to the science to say: well, we believe that if we do this then it should put into 
practice[,] the brain development bit[,] and therefore it will be reasonable to assume 
that it will have an impact on both parenting but also on baby’s brain development. 
And hopefully in a few years time we will actually start to see tangible benefits from 
that. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 During the interviews, and as we have sought to indicate throughout this paper, we were struck by 
how similar the reflections (including critical comments) of some of our respondents were to those 
made by social scientists. What does this say about policy engagements with the social sciences, not 
merely the neurosciences? We might, for instance, want to more broadly and more deeply consider the 
extent to which communities beyond technoscience are engaging with, drawing upon, reflexively 
instrumentalizing, and carefully critiquing concepts from STS itself in their work. If, though, some 
individuals are in fact distant from the academy, yet nevertheless seem to be spontaneously performing 
‘lay’ analysis in ways that evoke the concepts and arguments of social science, what is the distinctive 
value of specifically social scientific interpretation (cf. Savage and Brown, 2007)? 
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Respondent 8 expressed something similar when he ended an example of the way brain 
sciences help thinking about successful adoptions as follows: “In some ways, it doesn't have 
to be more complicated than that, and we don't like to overcomplicate our learning from the 
academic world.”  
Good policy, then, seems to rely on not “overcomplicating” matters through sustained 
and deep engagement with “the academic world” (Respondent 8). Instead, what is needed is 
“to take enough of the science” (Respondent 3) to ensure an intervention is in some sense 
justifiable by appeal to evidence. In an earlier part of the interview, Respondent 8 reflected 
more on what kind of approach to evidence he took for policymaking:  
So I mean, in some ways, […] I take quite a utilitarian approach to research and 
evidence. What is it I need to know that will help me to make sense of a policy, which 
otherwise could have just been driven […] by gut instinct and good judgement. But 
how far does good judgment get you without the evidence […]? […] [I]f you can't 
justify using that [approach], then […] politics will define what your priorities are. 
 
Respondent 3 argued that only by “simplifying the message” will it reach policy and practice: 
I think...well I suppose two things, one you have to simplify the message and I 
think...I initially trained as a scientist and I think the thing as a scientist you’re trying 
to meet scientific standards within your small community, you know what you’re 
talking about. But you have to consciously simplify the message and make it 
understandable to government, to opinion formers, and I think some scientists don't 
like that simplification process, because they’ll say well with certain caveats this is 
what the science says. Well actually, no, you need to turn it into a really clear message 
and say that...and even if it’s only 99 per cent true it’s effectively true. You have to 
knock the edges off the message a bit and say: right, this is what we know. And I 
suppose the other thing is that scientists themselves are not the people usually who 
are skilled at putting this into practice, they can do the science but then you need 
passionate people who will say this is really important and this is what we need to do 
with it and this is how we’re going to change things in a practical sense, rather than 
let scientists go off and say, well more research needs to be done. 
Thus, simplification supports a case for change (and not just for more research), in ways that 
more complicated messages would not. Such quotes can be seen as having similarities with 
the contingent repertoires analyzed by Gilbert and Mulkay (1982), in that interviewees are 
reflective of how they pragmatically use research, notwithstanding the empiricist repertoire 
they adopt in other contexts.  
This careful pragmatism also helps in engagement with service users. Respondent 1 
talked about the courses for parents she made, arguing: 
I think for us what is difficult, and the criticism that we’ll get, only from academics, 
not from anyone else, is that we don't obviously do masses of critical reflection. So, in 
an academic study you would say, for example, understanding about resilience say, 
you know that there are internal factors and there’s external factors and there’s 
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organic factors. What we do is condense all the findings and say these are the kind of 
key findings, right. What we then don't do, is go, but this person thinks it's ridiculous 
because it doesn’t show x, y or z…this has only been done with middle class parents 
or these people think it's not valid because it wasn't done with a controlled group etc. 
We don't go into that kind of critical reflection, because otherwise we would just 
confuse people, we're not in an academic context but a real world one. 
While too much information may confuse parents, presenting the science in a tentative way 
that still adopts a broadly empiricist framing is also one way of engaging them with parental 
courses: 
 
When we first started there was a perception that you only engaged with parents’ 
programs if you were a bad parent. What we did through consultation with parents, 
is we developed this and tried to make it as socially acceptable to attend. Also made it 
very high level professionally, so it feels like training, so everything is referenced, 
every single session is referenced with the research, and we're at pains to say, this is 
one sort of set of findings, or one sort of theory that talks about that. But, in general, 
the neuroscience, the resilience research, the attachment research, they are all 
pointing to the same things which is how we interact, how we relate to, how we 
behave with each other can have massive positive impact. (Respondent 1) 
 
A more contingent repertoire transforms what could have been a “behavioral management 
kind of thing” into socially acceptable training, in which the aim is not to “tell people what to 
do” but to stimulate them to reflect on their parenting practices. Hence, Respondent 1 is 
involved in creating a balance between, on the one hand, a referenced, professional training 
in which tentativeness helps to communicate the science (itself an interplay between 
empiricist and contingent repertoires), and on the other hand a program that does not involve 
so much tentativeness (and the information that induces this) that participants become 
confused. 
Pragmatic reductionism is not simply a case of always reducing scientific research to 
its “bare essentials.” Rather the form that the reduction takes depends on the imagined 
audience to which the message will be communicated and expectations regarding their prior 
knowledge and the uses to which they might put research. Whereas Respondent 1 said that 
some people did not think “professional concepts” such as attachment should be taught to 
parents, her experience has been “that parents just lap it up, they absolutely lap it up.” 
Similar to the ways in which the neurosciences are mobilized as a means of aligning 
“imagined understandings” among policy actors and practitioners, as we have shown above, 
these quotes show how the neurosciences can also be employed to connect the 
understandings of practitioners and parents/families. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed how a range of actors describe the salience of neuroscientific 
terms, concepts and findings, and account for the use of these in policy and practice within 
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Scotland. One of the fundamental problems of democratic societies is intervention: when and 
how should governmental and other actors intervene in the lives of citizens, and with what 
rationales? Studying the uses of neuroscience is one way of exploring the problematic of 
when and how to intervene as well as who (i.e., what kinds of subjects) ought to be governed 
(cf. Rose, O'Malley, and Valverde 2006; Lemke 2007).  
We have shown how the neurosciences are mobilized to legitimize planned policies, 
substantiate existing policies and services, and expand them (e.g., to attract funding for 
different target groups, such as babies). In so doing, expectations regarding policy outcomes 
are directed and consolidated. Scientific research, it seems, is perceived to at once influence 
the nature of a policy (e.g. by shifting target groups) whilst simultaneously acting as a 
resource for justifying the mutated policy or service for which there has been advocacy. This 
suggests an on-going choreography between the design and calibration of policy and 
services, and engagement with scientific knowledge that is perceived to have novelty, import 
and authority. In turn, the existence of such a dance implies the need for caution in any 
claims-making around the extent to which neuroscience “determines” particular social 
policies or interventions.  
Policy actors are frequently targeted by critics for simplifying science, or for failing to 
understand its nuances. Such criticism, however, elides the “messy complexity of the policy 
process” (Stevens and Ritter 2013, 169). Further, our data indicate that policy and service 
advisers and planners might be self-consciously engaged in a form of “pragmatic 
reductionism” (Beck and Niewöhner 2006, 223), in order to make politically palatable a 
complex feast of scientific research. They do this so that support and funding can be secured 
for interventions that they believe will better the lives of citizens.  
Accordingly, we suggest that engagements with neuroscience reflect expectations 
from various actors about both the utility of this body of research in lending epistemic 
authority to their plans for service design and delivery, as well as hopes around the kinds of 
citizens, and indeed the kind of world, that will be produced through the instantiation of 
neurobiological notions within policy. In this sense, an imaginary of the future is mobilized to 
change the present (Brown 2003). However, such expectations are perhaps somewhat low 
(though not negative; see Nerlich and Halliday 2007): our interviewees did not appear to 
consider that neuroscience would help to produce radical improvement in the world, but 
rather that it would help in small ways to improve particular aspects of the lives of some 
citizens. This may reflect the same ethic of pragmatism that underpinned the will to reduce 
the complexity of neuroscience that was evident in some of the interviews (see also Fitzgerald 
2014; Gardner, Samuel, and Williams 2015; Pickersgill 2011). 
We can see, then, that resonant with the scientists in Gilbert and Mulkay’s classic 
study (1982), individuals involved in social policy and services take findings and concepts 
from the neurosciences to be (more or less) true and (seek to) mobilize them in policies and 
interventions; and they are reflexive about how and why neuroscience occupies a place within 
the ecology of their policy domains. In other words, they often draw on an empiricist 
discourse whilst also sometimes adopting (and indeed interweaving) a more contingent 
repertoire. The empiricist-style discourse—which comes, perhaps paradoxically, to be 
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positioned within a regime of hope (Moreira and Palladino 2005)—serves important 
instrumental and symbolic functions (Boswell 2008). While the contingent, reflexive aspect of 
the respondents’ talk could relate in part to the relatively private nature of the sociological 
interview (Fitzgerald 2014), we argue that our data imply that contingent repertoires can also 
play an important and explicit public role in, for example, engaging with service users. 
Assuming such engagements are “successful,” we might consider whether neuroscience can 
be regarded as sparking not just the imaginations of policy actors and service innovators, but 
also those of the communities they seek to service—connecting these actors together and 
aligning them around particular goals based on such “mutual imagined understandings” 
(Martin, Brown, and Kraft 2008, 38). In this light, contingent talk comes to sit most readily 
within a regime of truth (Moreira and Palladino 2005), and can itself also be instrumentalized.  
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